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Two Problems of Fitting Grief 
Julius Schönherr  
Recent years have seen a surge in philosophical work on the rationality of grief. Much 
of this research is premised on the idea that people tend to grieve much less than 
would be appropriate or, as it is often called, fitting. My goal in this paper is diagnostic, 
that is, to articulate two never properly distinguished, and indeed often conflated, 
arguments in favor of the purported discrepancy between experienced and fitting 
grief: a metaphysical and a psychological argument. According to the former, grief is 
rationalized entirely by facts about the past. And because the past is unchangeable, 
grief can be said to remain forever fitting. According to the latter argument, humans’ 
emotional resilience causes grief to diminish at a faster rate than would be fitting. 
Which of these problems we end up facing, depends on relatively subtle variations 
in the characterization of the losses that render grief appropriate.  
 
1. Introduction 
Recent years have seen a surge in philosophical work on the fittingness – i.e. a specific kind of 
rationality – of backward-looking negative emotions such as grief, anger 1  and resentment 2 . A 
significant subset of this literature has focused on the fittingness of grief quite specifically (e.g. Moller 
2007, Marušić 2018, Cholbi 2017, 2018, Na’aman 2019). The fittingness of grief is also the focus of 
the present paper.  
Although purported philosophical insights gleaned from examining the rationality of grief vary 
starkly between philosophers, these insights, viewed from an aerial perspective, all depend on a 
perceived discrepancy between (1) the low levels of grief that people tend to experience after losing a 
loved one, and (2) much higher levels of grief that are rationally called for given the magnitude of the 
loss. One attractive way to understand this discrepancy between actual and rational grief is in terms of 
fittingness3; i.e. people tend to grieve less than would be fitting given the magnitude of their loss. My 
objective in this paper is to articulate two never properly distinguished, and indeed sometimes 
 
1 E.g. Shoemaker (2018), Callard (2017). 
2 Resentment has most recently been discussed in tandem with the nature of forgiveness; e.g. Hieronymi (2001), Fricker (2018), Milam (2018), Pettigrove 
(2012), Schönherr (2019).  
3 While it has recently become popular to cast this discrepancy explicitly in terms of fittingness (e.g. Marušić 2018, Na’aman 2019, Cholbi 2017), Moller’s 
earlier paper (2007) casts it in terms of ‘appropriate’ emotional responses. Cholbi (2017) uses both pieces of terminology – fittingness, and appropriateness 
– to describe the intended phenomena.  
conflated, arguments in favor of the purported discrepancy between actual and fitting grief: a 
metaphysical argument and a psychological argument. For now, let me briefly outline these arguments.  
Whether grief is fitting depends (in part) on a person’s relation to the deceased. The mere death of 
a person does not provide a fitting reason to grieve. This relation is paradigmatically cast as a love 
relation quite specifically. The exact focus on love should, however, be viewed as a convenient 
paradigm; not as a hard requirement (see Cholbi 2017, 257 for the same point). In this paper, I will 
stick to this paradigm. Grief fits the loss of a loved one.4  
Now, this formulation – ‘the loss of a loved one’ – is ambiguous between two readings. We could 
mean that grief fits loss only if we lost a person whom we used to love (prior to their death), or we 
could mean that grief fits loss only if we still love this person (after their death, as it were).5 Assuming 
the former, we can formulate what I call the ‘metaphysical argument’: Grief is fitting entirely in virtue 
of facts about the past (i.e. a person’s death and one’s past love to her). These facts remain forever 
unchanging which renders grief forever fitting. The attenuation of grief is, thus, always unfitting.  
On the second of the above readings we cannot formulate the metaphysical argument, because 
grief is rationalized in part by facts about the present; i.e. our continued love for the deceased. We 
can, however, formulate the psychological argument: Grief commonly diminishes faster than love, 
which is why most people grieve less than would be fitting.  
My first goal in this paper is to pinpoint a discrepancy in the literature. Authors such as Moller 
(2007) and Marušić (2018) draw a conclusion that we can only hope to support relying on the 
metaphysical argument – namely that grief is forever fitting – but they argue largely along the lines of 
the psychological argument. My second goal is to highlight that both arguments deserve philosophical 
attention.  
In the next section, I will lay out the distinction between fittingness and all things considered 
rationality. In section three, I shall detail, assess and situate the two above-mentioned arguments. 
 
4 The death of a person has been analyzed as the ‘reason’ (Na’aman 2019, Helm 2010) for grief, and the element of love has been called it’s ‘background 
condition’ (Na’aman 2019), or its ‘focus’ (Helm 2010). 
5 In real life, both senses often occur side by side. We often continue to love a person whom we loved when they were still alive. Nevertheless, the 
question of what exactly constitutes fitting grief remains. 
2. Fittingness and All Things Considered Rationality 
Grief is a fitting response to the loss of a loved one. It is, to be precise, the fact that a loved one was 
lost that provides the fitting reason for grief. This is a quite specific reason. In contrast, the total set 
of reasons rationalizing an emotion far outstrips this narrow class of fitting reasons. Thus, an attitude 
is rational all things considered, if and only if it is reasonable given the entirety of reasons of which fitting 
reasons are but a subset. An example might help. If an evil dictator promises not to torture me if I 
admire her, I surely have conclusive reason to admire her. Admiration, however, is not a fitting 
response to the dictator (see Howard 2018, 3).6 Such dictators are despicable, not admirable. Reasons 
that rationalize an attitude, without being fitting reasons, are known as the wrong kind of reasons (see 
Gertken & Kiesewetter 2017 for a summary).7 
Strikingly, people who experience negative emotions (e.g. anger, resentment or grief), almost always 
have available so-called ‘wrong reasons’ not to experience them. After all, negative emotions aren’t 
fun to have, which provides the bearers of these emotions with hedonic (i.e. self-interested) reason 
against having them. These hedonic considerations, however, don’t usually present fitting 
considerations against experiencing them. After becoming the victim of a severe offense, health-
related considerations might render it all things considered rational for a person to tame her anger. 
Anger may nevertheless be a fitting response to the offense (see Milam 2018).  
These insights can be applied to grief. A single mother who recently lost her husband and who 
needs to attend to the needs of her kids might have strong moral, and strategic reasons not to let grief 
overwhelm her (Cholbi 2017, 257). If these considerations are strong enough, then she has all things 
considered reason to grieve less, although grief remains fitting. As it turns out, the most pervasive 
driver behind the attenuation of grief – psychological resilience (see below) – is best understood as 
implementing such a ‘wrong reason’ by serving the grieving person’s forward-looking self-interest. 
We’ll come back to this in the next section. 
 
6 Crisp (2000), Parfit (2001, App. A), and Rabinowicz and Rønnow Rasmussen (2004) state variants of this example.  
7 For the purposes of this paper, I will assume that emotions are susceptible to the wrong kind of reasons, recognizing that reservations can be found in 
the literature (for a review see Gertken & Kiesewetter 2017). 
3. Two Problems of Fitting Grief  
In the introduction, I gave a quick overview of the two arguments concerning fitting grief. Let’s now 
look at both arguments in more detail starting with the metaphysical argument. 
In two recent papers, Dan Moller (2007) and Berislav Marušić (2018) have embraced the striking 
conclusion that grief remains forever fitting. Towards the end of his paper ‘Love and Death’ (2007), 
Moller has us imagine, somewhat dramatically, a species of  
super-resilient [aliens]. When their spouses drop dead in front of them, they shrug their 
shoulders and check what is on television. They remarry as soon as they are able to find 
another mate, often within weeks. (Moller 2007, 313) 
And although these aliens ‘show tremendous concern’ (Moller 2007, 314) for their spouses while they 
are alive, these feelings, we are told, are immediately extinguished after their death. Moller furthermore 
reminds us that actual people’s feelings are often akin to the feelings of such alien creatures: 
Wives and husbands remarry, often at depressingly brief intervals […] we retain photographs 
and other trinkets of remembrance, but all of the emotions that were once insurmountable 
barriers to similar relationships with others are irrecoverably lost. (Moller 2007, 301) 
In these cases, Moller alleges, grief remains appropriate despite the loss of emotions of attachment. 
Such responses are simply ‘incommensurate [with the] value [of our loved ones]’ (Moller 2007, 310). 
Note that, for Moller, this incommensurability is strongest in cases in which a bereaved spouse’s love 
vanishes after their partner’s death, which makes it likewise clear that Moller does not conceive of 
fitting grief to be dependent on the continuation of love. In line with this assessment, Moller remarks 
that   
[e]ven if it turned out that we undergo intense distress for a few years rather than a 
few months, the question of whether we have reason to regret the attitudes toward a 
lost spouse that resilience instills would remain. […] And, as I have argued, there are 
such reasons, though these reasons may be outweighed by other considerations. 
(Moller 2007, 315)  
Marušić reaches a similar conclusion:  
over time, as we grieve, it becomes not wrong to grieve less. However, I also think 
that there is no good way to understand this. When we try to understand it, all we find 
are reasons of the wrong kind. (Marušić 2018, 16) 
Of course, if grief remains forever fitting, it must, if attenuated at all, be attenuated for the wrong 
reasons. Such strong conclusions can only be justified by the idea that fitting grief is essentially 
backward-looking, rationalized only by maximally persistent facts about the past.  
Alternatively, we may hold that grief fits the loss of a person whom one still loves. According to 
this line of argument, the metaphysical problem set out above disappears, of course. After all, on this 
view, not all constituents of fitting grief are facts about the past, which is why our justification for this 
strong metaphysical claim falls flat. Grief may become less fitting over time; whether it does, simply 
depends on the (dis)continuation of love. But even if we assess the fittingness of grief based on a 
person’s remaining love for the deceased, we can recognize the possibility that grief often diminishes 
faster than love. Above I called this ‘the psychological argument’. 
This line of argument is most prevalent in Marušić’s argumentation. In a central passage, he states 
that  
my love [for my deceased mother] did not disappear as quickly and as thoroughly as my grief. 
My grief started diminishing very shortly after her death and its diminution was rapid and 
complete. Yet I love her more and longer than is reflected in my grief. (Marušić 2018, 5) 
Marušić’s self-report is empirically validated by a long and persuasive line of research in psychology 
about emotional resilience. This line of empirical research, conducted roughly over the past 20 years, 
provides powerful evidence supporting the idea that a significant proportion of the population exhibits 
a staggering degree of emotional adaptability. In response to an ‘emotionally disruptive event such as 
the death of a close relation [resilient individuals] maintain relatively stable, healthy levels of 
psychological and physical functioning as well as the capacity for generative experiences and positive 
emotions.’ (Bonanno 2004, 20)  
Further research on resilience indicates that around half of the population is resilient, and resilient 
individuals return to a baseline welfare level often after only four months of being bereaved without 
signs of depression or post-traumatic stress (e.g. Bonanno et al. 2005; Zisook et al. 1997, Litz et al. 
2002, Jordan et al. 2003). Given this research, we can be reasonably confident that resilience is real 
and widespread, although not ubiquitous. When a person’s grief is attenuated by natural resilience, at 
least that’s a reasonable suspicion, it diminishes for the wrong reason, while the bereaved person’s 
love for the deceased continues. 
Both Marušić and Moller heavily rely on findings from psychological resilience research in arguing 
their case. It is worth noting that, in the context of the metaphysical argument, psychological resilience 
simply makes no difference whatsoever. After all, according to this argument, the attenuation of grief 
is always unfitting. Resilience is important only in the context of the psychological argument, because 
it provides powerful evidence that grief commonly attenuates faster than love. In the context of the 
psychological argument, however, we can’t embrace the conclusion that grief must be attenuated for 
the wrong reasons. Pointing to this tension in the literature, between resilience-based arguments and 
conclusions about grief’s unceasing fittingness, is the first goal of this paper.  
Before continuing on, I must insert a note on the scope of both arguments. In the preceding 
discussion, I limited my analysis to the role two elements – love and death – have in assessing the 
fittingness of grief. I don’t, however, wish to insist that these are the only relevant elements. For 
instance, in an insightful recent article, Oded Na’aman defends the idea that grief is one of many 
‘rationally self-consuming [attitudes], the longer they endure the less rational they become.’ (Na’aman 
2019, 3) One of Na’aman’s guiding claims is that grief can become less fitting because we’ve already 
experienced some, thereby introducing a further element that bares on the fittingness of grief. Here is of 
course not the place to evaluate this novel proposal. For now, I simply wish to note that there is room 
to supplement the reasons under discussion with further reasons that may also bear on the fittingness of 
grief.8 
I shall use the rest of this paper to assess both arguments for their plausibility. My goal is of course 
not to settle the debate. Rather, my aim is simply to point out that both arguments work with a distinct 
but prima facie plausible characterizations of the kind of losses that render grief appropriate. Naturally, 
the ensuing discussion will start with and focus on the metaphysical argument, as it strikes many as 
less intuitive.  
 
8 Another example of such a further specification can be found in Moller (2017) who, in this handbook entry, briefly considers the possibility of a ‘new 
self condition,’ according to which grief may become less fitting as we ‘become sufficiently different people,’ and the loss ceases to be my loss. 
First, a word of caution. Intuition is often a reliable guide in assessing whether an emotion is all 
things considered rational. For instance, any theory advocating that it is all things considered rational 
to grieve forever contradicts our pretheoretical commitments and should presumably be rejected. We 
should, however, be somewhat cautious when likewise probing our intuitions for judgments about 
fittingness. For instance, the pretheoretical judgement that, at some point after losing a loved one, one 
‘no longer grieve[s] – and this is somehow all right,’ (Marušić 2018, 17) arguably operates on the level 
of all things considered rationality. It is all things considered ‘all right’ to stop grieving after some time. 
Whether there are interesting desiderata grounded in intuition beyond these all things considered 
judgments remains controversial. All possibilities seem to be live options; i.e. that grief remains forever 
fitting, that grief’s fittingness attenuates with one’s waning love, or that grief may eventually cease to 
be fitting ‘alongside the continuation of love’9.  
Second, throughout this paper I have emphasized that grief is forever fitting only if we keep the 
focus on one’s past love to the deceased. The reverse is not true, however. While grief’s focus on one’s 
past love is necessary for the statement of the metaphysical argument, it may not be sufficient. Let me 
explain. Just above, I briefly referenced Na’aman’s thesis that grief is ‘rationally self-consuming,’ 
illustrating the possibility that further reasons might impact how we think of the fitting trajectory of 
grief. At least on the face of it, both could be true: grief, when fitting, may respond to a griever’s past 
love to the deceased and grief is rationally self-consuming. And if this turns out to be true, then grief 
may fittingly attenuate while still focusing on the bereaved person’s past love. Thus, again, the focus 
on one’s past love is necessary, not sufficient, for the metaphysical argument.  
Third, and most importantly, one of Moller’s key claims in ‘Love and Death’ is that grief 
emotionally registers certain losses (e.g. Moller 2007, 310). If I lose my spouse and a week later my 
love for them, it would still be true of me that I’ve lost something that was of utmost value to my life. 
Grief, on this picture, is a fitting response in so far as its presence would emotionally register my loss. 
The fact that I’ve lost something important, and the concomitant fact that it would be appropriate to 
emotionally register this loss, both remain true notwithstanding my instant emotional adjustment. 
Alternatively, in line with the psychological argument, one may hold that the death of a loved one 
is a loss only if it continues to be experienced as a loss. If I stop caring, it might be true that I lost 
something precious, but it does not present itself as a loss to me. The idea that a lack of care can render 
 
9 This formulation was suggested by a reviewer.  
an emotion unfitting is familiar from emotions such as fear. My fear that you’ll knock over my vase 
ceases to be fitting when I stop caring about the vase altogether (e.g. Helm 2010, 58). Similarly, we 
might hope to maintain that grief is a fitting response to the death of a loved one only if we continue 
to care about this person; i.e. only if our love continues. One interesting consequence of this view – 
suggested by one anonymous reviewer – is that grief is thereby rendered fitting not just because it 
responds to a loss that lies in the past, but because of the ‘ongoing ramifications of the past’; i.e. the 
continued emotional involvement that makes grief a fitting response to the death of a loved one.  
The bottom line is that both ways of conceptualizing the losses seem to have traction. However, 
the dramatic conclusion that grief remains forever fitting isn’t simply an extension of the psychological 
argument; it is a conclusion provided by a different argument. There are at least two distinct 
philosophical problems of fitting grief and both need to be addressed in their own right. But this will 
have to wait for some other time. 
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